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INSTRUMENTAL VISION 
Rose Woodcock 
Stereo-immersive "virtual reality" (VR) technology enables the perceiver to experi-
ence what it is like to be immersed in a simulated environment. While the simulation 
is powered by the "geometry engine" (Cutting 1997: 31) associated with high-end 
stereoscopic computer imaging technology, the visual experience itself is powered 
by ordinary human vision: the vision system's innate capacity to see "in 3D". By 
way of a specific critique of the visuality of stereo-immersive VR, this chapter sug-
gests that we think about the "practice" of vision, and consider on what basis vision 
can have its own "materiality". In an oblique approach to the notion of a material 
practice associated with the making of (pictorial) art, preference here is given to 
pictorial perception over picture making, which prompts the question: What comes 
first: pictures, or the capacity to see pictorially? A quick answer to this is that pic-
tures are only pictures, because they are perceived pictorially (otherwise, they would 
be sundry objects whose visible attributes are only "pictorial" inasmuch as they are 
arbitrarily deemed so). Yet we only perceive pictorially in any meaningful, knowledge-
bearing sense, when we are perceiving a picture as a picture: thus, the answer would 
seem to require that pictures and pictorial perception be understood as part of a 
peculiar dialectical ontology, in which neither one can be meaningfully grounded in 
experience without the other. To preference their perception over their material fact, 
then, is simultaneously a defence of the picture as an object. Pictures do not nec-
essarily need defending (as a class of objects, they continue to proliferate), but they 
do warrant attention. It is not the "primary heuristic function" (Hagen 1986: 82) of 
pictures to educate the viewer about aspects of the ordinary visual world. However, 
as a "special" perceptible object amidst all the ordinary objects in the visible world, 
pictures - through the perceptual experiences they elicit - can teach us important 
things about the possibilities of human visual awareness. 
Understanding why pictures matter (given the options in a cultural milieu rich in 
alternative visualities) necessitates that we consider what it is like to see a picture as 
a picture; but it is also helpful to ask what it is not like. What is the antithesis of a 
picture, and (therefore) of pictorial perception? For the purposes of the argument, a 
critique of the visuality of stereo-immersive VR reveals an unlikeness that is exem-
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plary: namely, a difference between what it is like to perceive pictorially, and what it 
is like to perceive ordinarily. Moreover, where a dialectic ("heuristic") can be found 
at work in pictorial perception - that is in response to the material artifact whereby 
one encounters a paradoxical "duality of both a scene and a surface" (Gibson 1978: 
231) -in stereo-immersive VR there is no such material artifact; and for perceptual 
experience, no such dialectical effort required. 
What are the consequences, if any, of stereo-immersive VR's release (for vision) 
from the burden of a materiality of the perceptible? In this chapter, a particular per-
ceptual materiality is associated with the flat, pictorial imagery we encounter in a 
painting. However, aside from the painting as a material artifact, of greater interest 
here is the relationship between the artifact and the pictorial mode of perception it 
elicits. For, insofar as this relationship has a definable ontology it is, ironically, of a 
more "virtual" kind than that encountered by a perceiver in a "virtual" environment. 
Certainly, stereo-immersive VR presupposes a relationship between perceiver and 
the object of perception. However, for all its sophistication as a virtual imaging tech-
nology, the possibilities for perception afforded in a "virtual" environment return 
the perceiver to the conditions of an ordinary visual experience. That is, objects and 
surfaces appear perceptually robust in their solid three-dimensionality. We should 
therefore study not VR's purported "virtuality", but the specifications of its visuality. 
The Invisible Interface 
Clearly, an environment, real or virtual, is not just like seeing a very large, all-encom-
passing picture, although ordinary environments do have aspects that are "pictorial": 
looking at objects in the distance assumes a "flat" or monoscopic mode of percep-
tion. In the vision science literature, monoscopic information is termed "pictorial" 
(Palmer 1999: 248). Yet VR is an art too. It assumes a technique (and a studio) and 
must also assume a specific materiality- both for its makers and its audience: yet its 
strategies, technologies and affects are part of an apparatus that is designed specif-
ically to erase all visible traces of the very conditions by which it would be possible 
for an "immersant" to report on how they perceive the contents of a virtual envi-
ronment. The question of what it is like to perceive "environmentally", requires a 
different approach to understanding visual perception than the question of what is 
it like to perceive pictorially. 
This essay considers the significance of James J. Gibson's (1904-1979) contri-
bution to the fields of vision research and computer-generated stereo-immersive 
VR, acknowledging how Gibson's innovative work in the mid-1940s (developing 
rudimentary flight simulators for fighter-pilot training) foreshadowed the work to 
be done for later stereo-immersive VR developers (Gibson 1947). Gibson's chief 
contribution was that he developed an ecological approach for the study of visual 
perception, which theorized vision in terms of the reciprocal relationship between 
perceiver and environment. For Gibson, the formulation of a theory of percep-
tion should begin by understanding the nature of the visible, external environment 
in which the perceiver is immersed. Thus, for Gibson, the question "what it is like 
to perceive?" already assumes a percept, whose ecological reality (its validity as an 
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environment) is grounded in its being "ordinary" for the perceiver. Environments, 
according to Gibson, cannot be paradoxical. According to this logic, they cannot 
be dualistic or inherently ambiguous in the manner of the perceptual experiences 
they afford. Thus, certain key indices associated with perceiving "environmentally", 
emerge when ordinary perceptual experience is compared with pictorial perception. 
While such a comparison does not obviate questions of ontology, it does suggest 
that the ontological basis of a "reality" sufficient for immersion in VR, is to be 
found in vision itself rather than in the virtuality associated with the idea of VR. 
This is important, because it allows for the experience of immersion in a so-called 
"virtual" environment to be defined as a perceptual reality, obviating the need for re-
course to ill-defined (that is, metaphysical) notions of "the virtual". The nature of 
the stereo-immersive experience can be defined, then, through a Gibsonian ecologi-
cal approach to visual perception. 
The question of reality (whether virtual or actual) can be addressed (as above) by 
emphasizing how the perceptual system encounters its worlds (reality), rather than 
by questioning whether or not these worlds or environments are "real". This can be 
further elaborated, with the argument that, for a perceptual reality to operate like an 
environment, three distinctive visual-perceptual aspects must also be in play: 
• 
• 
• 
the absence of a tangible interface (such as a surface or screen); 
the state of seeming immersed in a three-dimensional space amidst solid-
looking objects (stereo-immersion); 
the opportunity for mobility of the observer-immersant in that virtual 
space. 
The practicalities and problems involved in achieving these three aspects or "af-
fordances" are technically demanding. Yet the lack of an apparent interface, the ap-
pearance of 3D stereo-scopic ("solid") spaces, and the affordance of self-mobility 
in the virtual environment are not so much techniques and strategies devised by VR 
developers, as those very qualities of an external environment to which human visual 
perception has adapted. Insofar as our ordinary perceptual experience is of a reality 
of some kind, the defining quality of this reality, as far as we can truly experience it, is 
its "realness". My critique of the visuality of stereo-immersive VR, centers on what I 
regard as an implicit collapsing, or merging of the inherent affordances (possibilities) 
of visual perception, into the technical requirements of a simulated "realness". 
Ordinary stereoscopic binocular perception of three-dimensional depth, while 
strictly relative, does enable us to reach and grasp near objects and gauge distances 
between things with reasonable accuracy. Human stereo-acuity "specifies ratios" 
(Palmer 1999: 207) rather than simply designate that one object or surface is in front 
of or behind another. The reciprocal relationship between perceiver and environ-
ment posits binocular stereo-acuity as the fulcrum around which VR developers 
achieve their main objective, defined in the VR literature as the "perceptual illusion 
of non-mediation" (Lombard & Ditton 1997: n.p.). The danger of this particular 
and powerful reciprocity is twofold. First, vision is aligned to the production of per-
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ceptually narrow, or ordinary ends. Second, it suggests a shift toward an instrumental 
approach to the possibilities of visual experience, which threatens to overwhelm 
what might otherwise be an interest (for the VR discourse) in vision's transformative 
and performative possibilities. As an instrument, vision - our inherent binocular 
visuality - risks becoming a means to an end, reduced to functioning as an extension 
of the "geometry engine". This endows vision with great potential. But in addition 
to gaining instrumental power, vision loses (or is not required to submit to) a special 
potency that is also inherent to human visual perception: the capacity to see more 
than what is environmentally "valid". 
In "Art as Technique", Viktor Shklovsky (1893-1984) develops a similar thesis 
through his concept of "estrangement" (de-familiarisation), stating that, "the pro-
cess of perception is an end in itself and must be lengthened" (Shklovsky 1965). 
Most of us see the world with two eyes, and it is the two eyes' lateral displacement 
that produces disparity between the two retinal images for a given scene. This dispar-
ity triggers stereopsis, or "3D" stereoscopic vision; evidence that the visual system has 
adapted to perceive (more or less correctly) the visual structure of a three-dimen-
sional environment. Yet, as vision scientist David Marr (1945-1980) notes, "the eye 
apparently regards changes in depth as so important that they must be made explicit 
everywhere, including places where there is no direct evidence for them" (Marr 1982: 
51). This implies that the visual system does not require specifically three-dimen-
sional (stereoscopic) information to have perceptual experiences that are "spatial", 
since the range of information that is spatial in structure includes both monoscopic 
(pictorial) and stereoscopic sources. Marr's observation is suggestive: it implies that 
the visual system has an innate capacity - an "appetite" - for seeing something as 
something else, and that perception is preordained for being "lengthened" just as 
Shklovsky implores. 
The inter-workings of the three affordances of VR outlined above define a differ-
ence between the realness of ordinary reality and the realism of conventional media 
such as paintings, drawings, photographs and films. The significance of the term 
"media" arises here. Related to Shklovsky's notion of "estrangement" is the sense in 
which a picture "mediates" our perception of its contents, in ways that an ordinary 
environment cannot. Art historian Barbara Marie Stafford articulates how pictures 
do not yield their contents unproblematically, when she describes what a painting 
does pictoriai!J. The painting (by Pehr Hillestrom c. 1800): 
[S]hows how attaining the goal of a visual search can be knowingly deferred, 
prolonging the capture of the eye within material substance and deepening 
visual attention so that the cognitive system can examine additional properties. 
(Stafford 2007: 146) 
Importantly, this understanding of what it is like to look at a picture, gives due at-
tention to what a picture is as a parlicular class of mediatory objects in the world: 
that is, "a surface so treated [that it] always specifies something other than what it is" 
(Gibson 1978: 228-229). 
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Gibson's Contribution 
Gibson was a perceptual psychologist with a special interest in the epistemology of 
vision (Reed & Jones 1982: ix). As Gibson worked to overturn the incumbent struc-
turalism of Classical understandings of human vision, he also rejected the Kantian 
idealization of space. The concept of space, Gibson argued, "has nothing to do with 
perception" (Gibson 1979: 3). In the reciprocal relationship between perceiver and 
environment, a "perceiver" belongs to a perceptual rystem- involving eyes, head, and 
body in motion - evolved in response to an external environment. An environment 
is a mute, physical externality, but it is also fundamentally a repository of sensory 
information. The term "ecology" emphasizes how the illuminated layout of surfaces 
and textures in an environment, provides all the visual information needed by an ac-
tive perceiver on the move. For Gibson, what is not perceptible to an observer is re-
dundant, irrelevant to theorizing vision: an ecological approach overrides the need to 
theorize vision according to internal "mental processing". Gibson's rejection of the 
notion of mental images relates to his argument that, instead of such intangibles, we 
think about real surfaces and their layout within an illuminated environment. Rather 
than recourse to internal processes inside the perceiver's head, so Gibson argues, let 
this external illuminated layout be the basis for the formulation of a theory of per-
ception. Associated terms such as "optic flow" and "invariant structure" similarly re-
late the actions (self-motion) of an observer to Gibson's notion that visual informa-
tion is immanent, always available; embedded in the very structure of ambient light. 
Information about direction, distance, orientation, etc. is made perceptible through 
the active perceptual behavior of the perceiver. Thus the realness of the perceived 
environment is grounded in the reciprocity between perceiver and environment. 
Reference to Gibson's theory is important, because it suggests an epistemological 
link between the (Gibsonian) ecological approach to understanding visual perception, 
and the "instrumentalization of vision" within the discourse of stereo-immersive 
VR. Gibson's contribution to the development of stereo-immersive VR has imbued 
that discourse with an emphasis on realness through an "instrumental" approach to 
vision. For example, in an autobiographical passage from 1966, Gibson explains his 
decision to make an instructional film for AAF Fighter Pilots, and compare it with 
the best possible instructional manual and illustrated lecture available at the time to 
see what was needed to improve the pedagogy. Gibson and others analyzed AAF 
Production Unit training films to "develop a theory of what a motion picture shot 
could do that nothing else could" (Reed & Jones 1982: 17). The results were that 
aviation cadets "learned significantly more" from the moving image display with its 
flow of information, than from the conventional instructional material: 
The reasons were fairly clear. What had to be learned was a system of how 
to aim at a moving target (fighter plane) from a moving platform (bomber). 
As the situation changed, the action changed. The film showed how one thing 
varied with another; the book and the talk could graph it, represent stages of 
it, and describe it in several ways, but could not display the continuous covari-
ation in time. Moreover, and this impressed me, the film could make use of 
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the 'subjective camera,' taking the point of view of the learner and displaying 
how the situation would look to him, not merely what things looked like. (Reed 
& Jones 1982: 17) 
Gibson's emphasis on how the animated display gives the observer a sense of 
"continuous covariation in time" and particularly, how it inserted the observer's own 
view-point at the center of the flow of images, is more like a description of a virtual 
reality display than of conventional cinema. Gibson's own account of the achieve-
ment, can be interpreted in terms of what would be an ideal visual experience for a 
trainee pilot: a seamless virtual environment which appears real, not just in terms of 
the content of the imagery, but in terms of how this imagery behaves in relation to 
the observer in motion, in real time. 
While "virtual reality" (VR) means different things to different people, the idea of 
VR has lasting cultural significance (Ryan 2001: 1 ). For the purposes of the argu-
ment, I have privileged vision, and explicitly linked VR to stereoscopic 3D imaging 
technologies worn by an "immersant": typically a stereoscopic head-mounted display 
(HMD) and motion tracking sensors, linked to a computer system, which provides 
real-time visual input. "Stereo-immersive" refers to the way 3D imagery surrounds 
a perceiver, immersing them in the imagery that thereby becomes a visual "world" 
for the duration of the experience. What the perceiver's head is inside of in the case 
of stereo-immersive VR, is not just a piece of equipment, but a "perceptual ecolo-
gy" in which the requisite perceptible information is generated by a high-end com-
puter imaging system. The reciprocity, here, between perceiver and "virtual reality" 
is exemplary in its Gibsonian perceptual-ecologic. Essentially this is a relationship in 
which "[t]otal sensory immersion depends in the long run on our ability to enter into 
what our senses receive" (Heim 1998: 28). The visual sense need not discriminate 
between "actual" and "virtual" sources of imagery: the visual system - eyes, head, 
body in motion - is inherently adaptable, and is equanimous toward the perceptual 
affordances of virtual and actual ecologies alike. 
Realism and Realness 
A material practice of vision can be articulated by comparing the realism of painting 
with the realness of ecological perception. Stereo-immersive VR can have its reali-
ty in ways that a picture cannot: no discernible interface, three-dimensional "solid" 
space, and capacity for self-motion that reaffirms the first two conditions. What is 
missing from ordinary perception is a mode of vision peculiar to visual engage-
ment with an object which itself emerged from the material practice in the studio. 
However, it is not that the materiality of the object simply instigates a response from 
vision that corresponds with the pictorial object's material genealogy. Rather, in ad-
dition to this correspondence is the visual-perceptual effort which must be engaged 
to bring the mute visible object into being as a picture. According to this way of 
understanding, it might be said that pictorial perception makes pictures, not painters! This 
could be elaborated to argue that pictorial perception and pictures are themselves an 
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ecology, involving a reciprocity between perceiving and making pictures, from which 
the notion of a poiesis in and of vision emerges. 
As a category of pictorial art, realism includes a broad range of styles, traditions, 
and artistic and cultural values and intentions. The kind of realism of interest here 
belongs to the broad category of photorealism (which helps in the comparison 
against computer graphic representation, which is photorealistic by default). Refer-
ence works would include those by such painters as Giotto and Lorenzetti from the 
post-Byzantine era, and even Cimabue before them, as well as Caravaggio and con-
temporary realist painters such as William Bailey. In this regard, the realism of inter-
est is tacitly mimetic. For while their paintings are clearly not photorealistic as such, 
Cimabue, Giotto and other early European artists have contributed to the tradition 
of illusionism by establishing the break with Medieval and Byzantine systems of rep-
resentation. For these artists from the thirteenth century onwards, the establishment 
of pictorial strategies for representing space was vital. In particular, "artificial" and 
Oater) "synthetic" perspectives were highly significant conventions in systematizing, 
in pictorial terms, the shape and texture of external reality. John White writes in The 
Birth and Rebirth of PictorialS pace: 
The new artificial perspective was a tool finely fashioned to perform the three 
tasks for which the greatest masters used it from the moment of its inception: 
the creation of pictorial space; the organisation of the composition; and the 
maintenance of a perfect harmony between this new reality and the surface 
upon which it has its being. (White 1967: 167) 
This mimetic tradition related to the notion of "perfect harmony" finds a will-
ing ally in stereo-immersive VR (and computer graphics generally), since VR is an 
approach to representation that not only references, but reconstitutes the way an 
illuminated environment, real or imagined, displays itself visually as a surface layout 
(note the Gibsonian terminology). Immersive stereoscopic VR is uniquely empow-
ered to instantiate the lit environment, since it alone, as a system of visual repre-
sentation, can array surfaces in three-dimensions; and it can illuminate itself. Virtual 
imaging technology is thus well fashioned as a fine tool for the creation, not of pic-
torial illusionistic space, but three-dimensional, corporeal "actual" space. However, 
in terms of the stereoscopic imaging system harmonizing its "new reality" with the 
"surface upon which it has its being", the analogy falls apart: where or what exactly 
is the "surface" in stereo-immersive VR? 
Of course, Caravaggio's realism is not reducible to just its material means: the 
organization of those means in pictorial terms is particularly significant. It shows 
how the limited corporeality of paint across a flat surface, gives us volumetric forms 
in space that are present to us pictorially. In achieving his corporeality pictorialfy, 
Caravaggio's painterly realism differs fundamentally from the "real" corporeality of 
virtual objects in a space shared by an observer-immersant: in the latter, the corpore-
ality is volumetrically, phenomenally real. In stereo-immersive VR, this achievement 
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16. Caravaggio, Supper at Emmaus, 1601-1602, oil on canvas, 139 x 195 em 
is not a matter of pictorial interpretation but of perceptual realness. This use of the 
term "realism", then, concerns the operations of pictorial conventions in efforts to 
represent reality pictorially; whereas realness pertains to the quality of someone's ex-
perience of something that is real (their perception of that reality; their sense that 
what they are perceiving is real, irrespective of its ontological status as Reality). 
Emphasis here is on the manner of the visual structuring of the virtual content in 
stereo-immersive VR, rather than on how the contents - objects, figures, scenes -
are depicted (for example, whether through figurative, expressionistic, impression-
istic, abstract, photorealistic, or other modes of representation). To help clarify this 
point, consider the historic trend toward photographic realism in Western art: that is, 
(arguably) "any stylistic change in the photographic direction would produce an im-
pression of realism, to the extent that photographic fidelity provides the criterion of 
realism" (Hagen 1986: 81). Let us accept for the moment that photographic fidelity 
is an accepted criterion of a certain kind of realism in pictorial art. Further, that pho-
torealism can be qualified to mean: the observable behavior of light (photons; hence 
photo-) hitting various textured and colored surfaces in an environment, as recorded 
by the artist, such that the picture's contents resemble the visual structure of that 
environment from a fixed point of observation, thus capturing to the best of the 
artist's abilities, what that environment is really like, visually, for an observer (realism), 
from that particular point of observation. In pictorial, static art, conventions such as 
artificial perspective, and greater finesse in rendering shading across volumetric form 
(with the advent of oil paint), were devices that brought Renaissance painting closer 
to the qualified definition of photorealism set out above. Pictorial realism in (say) a 
Caravaggio, attends indexically (via mimesis) to the realness of visual aspects of the 
actual world or its imagined equivalent. Caravaggio's painting of Supper at Emmaus 
(Figure 16) subscribes to the criterion of photographic fidelity in this regard, through 
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his use of pictorial conventions of realistic representation. The way light falls across 
surfaces and casts shadows to reveal volumetric form (chiaroscuro); the way reflected 
light bounces the color from one surface to another, for instance on the skin of the 
hands and face near the red cloak ("radiosity"); the way the outstretched hand of the 
figure on the right appears larger than that of the central figure (foreshortening); the 
way near objects occlude far objects, and the way the table surface takes on a tapered 
rhomboid shape (artificial or synthetic perspective), are all visual aspects that can be 
readily observed in the actual world. Pictorial realism borrows from, but does not 
purport to recreate, this world in full as a "reality". As Svetlana Alpers observes in 
Dutch painting of the Seventeenth Century, this style of representational painting is 
(among other things) an art of describing what is observable in the visible world. 
Certainly, something is recreated in the painting - pedagogical, moral, aesthetic, 
perceptual and existential aspects or "values" that the observer can interpret from 
the content, formal configuration of elements, style, and cultural and historical con~ 
texts; from what the painting is "about". Caravaggio surely did not expect to recreate 
the world of Supper at Emmaus, except according to the limited means of pictorial 
communication available to him at the time. As well as the various technologies of 
oil paint and brush, and the skills in applying them to the canvas, these limited means 
include the pictorial conventions of shading, foreshortening, perspective, etc. They 
are limited because they are tied to the conventions of pictorial art, which must oper-
ate across a flat surface of some designated size. They are conventions insofar as they 
arise from and address these limitations in specifically pictorial and painterly terms. 
Realism does not adequately account for the experience of realness in immersive 
virtual environments, because the two are different orders of experience: and the 
difference is of an entirely other, additional dimension. This is not simply because 
it is the stated goal of developers of VR to construct virtual "realities", and because 
public hype about VR leads expectations in that direction. What is significant to the 
perceptual experience of stereo-immersive VR, and what is not available or expected 
from the experience of looking at Caravaggio's Supper at Emmam, is that objects and 
spaces appear perceptually, not pictorially, real and solid. Gibson is helpful on this 
point, stating that when we "scan" a picture for informacion, we are "generally in 
search of meaning", not its "structure". Anything other than meaning from a picture 
is, for Gibson, "a sort of perceptual luxury" (Gibson 1966: 250). This difference in 
perceptual structure, between notional pictorial space and corporeal actual space, 
marks an important epistemological shift, brought about by virtual imaging tech-
nologies, from the representation to the presentation of perceptual spaces. 
Instrumental Realities 
In a critique aimed at the positivist discourse of Western science, Bruno Latour 
states that laboratories "are now powerful enough to define t'ea!i(y'' (Latour 1987: 
87). Science can deem something to be real, to really exist: it can be named, mea-
sured, synthesized, or even cloned. However, a curious problem in defining an envi-
ronment as a reality built entirely from information arises, because a "virtual reality" 
will typically be a short term experience, and its world will only contain whatever 
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the designers and technicians have put into it. As an artificial, constructed reality, 
it has no immanent "history" (although its contents may be historical in character) 
and no "future" because it can be turned off or "crash" at any time. Thus, a virtual 
environment seems on this basis to be a limited and transitory case of a real-like 
world. However, this makes the Gibsonian task all the more vital. Gibson states thaf 
"insofar as ambient light has structure it specifies the environment, and that differences 
in the light at the point of observation structure that light as containing 'informa-
tion"' (Gibson 1979: 51). Thus, the reality conditions required for it to be like an 
environment are not determined by factors outside and beyond immediate, temporal 
perception- such as real time and space (which become abstractions from the point 
of view inside the VR apparatus). Rather, reality can be "specified" on demand, and 
rendered through technical solutions based on a strategy of temporality: a world 
that is real enough for the time being. Crucial to the realness this implies, is the role of 
self-motion for the perceiver. 
Gibson developed the concept of a visible "invariant structure" to explain how 
perception picks up information about the structure of an environment. To elab-
orate the concept, Gibson argues that the motion of the observer helps reveal the 
persistent ("invariant") layout, the actual structure of environmental features, such 
that buildings, other people, trees, rocks, etc. appear as solid objects. Invariant struc-
ture in relation to a moving observer indicates changes in perspective (or point of 
view) toward an object- that is, it confirms that the object itself does not physically 
distort. Thus, objects appear larger the closer we are to them (they do not normally 
grow in physical size); surfaces of objects similarly appear to change (the top of the 
cup does not physically change from a circle to an ellipse), and so on. In turn, this 
subtle translation in their appearance confirms that objects in the layout are solid, 
and occupy three-dimensional space in a manner continuous with the persistent sta-
bility of the surrounding environment. Hans Jonas explains the point succinctly: 
The possession of a body in space, itself a part of the space to be apprehend-
ed, and that body capable of self-motion in counterplay with other bodies, is 
the precondition for a vision of the world. Ganas 2001: 156) 
That stereo-immersive VR enables an immersant to move - even just to lean in or 
out from a standing position, turn the upper body, or move the head - establishes 
a relationship between observer and environment that is perceptually real. The ob-
server moves: yet only to the physical extent of the VR laboratory, which also defines 
the extent of the fictive world in which the observer is "free" to move physically. 
The immersant remains in the same physical location but experiences a shift of 
so called realities. This effective movement indicates the extent to which vision in 
stereo-immersive VR becomes an extension of the imaging technology. For the only 
thing that really happens - transforms- is that the visual imagery changes (again, 
leaving other sensory modes aside): initially, to replace whatever was in view before 
the head-mounted display is put on, and thereafter in accord with the tracked move-
ments of the observer, to which the visual-perceptual faculty responds as though 
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those movements were real in relation to the virtual content. Any residual pictoriality 
of objects in a virtual environment is largely overwhelmed by the perception that the 
objects in it are volumetrically solid; that they corporeally occupy space at distances 
that co-vary with the observer's movements. 
The Origins of VR 
The notion of a timeless "Edenic" natural world is an alluring one, and Nature 
might be the conceptual foundation for notions of a pre-existing, external reality. 
Nature (or "the natural") provides a necessary existential counterpoint to the ex-
perience of Being. Leaving existentialism aside, it must be said that natural scenes 
are "the obvious proving ground for realism" (Blake 1990: 403), in the discourse of 
"solid" VR. The application of Gibson's research on ecological optics to the design 
of computer-generated "virtual" environments, is evidence of the fit between "na-
ture" and "the real". In Western epistemology, progress assumes a modernist, sci-
entific paradigm. However, the discourse of stereo-immersive VR entails a peculiar 
"philosophical regression" (Penny 1994: 200) in which nature is again idealized as 
the representational perceptual schema for "the real". 
Yet, the implicit ideology of VR is simultaneously Modernist, for in presuppos-
ing that if Nature, that is to say, "reality" can be known and represented, then it 
can be re-made (re-presented) synthetically. The theme of Nature as something to 
be abstracted, controlled and manipulated in order that we understand it, underlies 
Western epistemology. Nature as a "resource" to be controlled and exploited, is as-
sociated with scientific practices that emerged at the beginnings of Modernity, which 
saw nature as the '" inexhaustible' source of 'resources' which must be obedient to 
man's demands" (Ihde 1991: 56). This is also Heidegger's concern in his essay "The 
Question Concerning Technology", an early, thorough, and still relevant critique of 
Modernity as a manifestation of an instrumentalising "technoscience". Heidegger 
regards modern science (technology) as a way of representing the world that "pur-
sues" and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces. Modern physics is par-
ticularly suspect for Heidegger: 
Because physics, indeed already as pure theory, sets nature up to exhibit itself 
as a coherence of forces calculable in advance, it orders its experiments pre-
cisely for the purposes of asking whether and how nature reports itself when 
set up this way. (Heidegger 1977: 303) 
The problem of reality (whether it can be known) was especially the case in the 
past, when understanding of human physiology and the physics of light was lim-
ited. The neurophysiologist Margaret Livingstone notes that "the vertebrate eye is 
so complex that it was (and sometimes still is) used as an argument against evolution 
and in favor of divine intelligence" (Livingstone 2002: 24). Thus vision is empow-
ered, here, as a theological instrument: it constitutes reality as an instrument of (a 
"proof" for) intelligent design. In these now relatively secular times, we might re-
main wary of a potential "confounding'' from such interfering ideologies. Yet VR 
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developers have absorbed certain practices - which could be called ideologies - in 
relation to the way they represent the inherent capabilities of human vision. The 
heavy reliance on vision science, and in particular a Gibsonian ecological theory, is 
a particular instance where there has been a collapsing of the physiological with the 
epistemic in vision. This is a potent mix, for Gibson's ecological model is so success-
ful, as a model of how a perceiver picks up ecologically valid information from the 
visible environment in order to disambiguate its rich complexity, that VR developers 
have not needed to look elsewhere for an understanding (a representation; a model) 
of how else we might encounter perceptual reality. 
It is important, therefore, to consider how VR researchers and developers have ac-
quired and developed their understanding of space as something habitable which af-
fords exploratory motion within. Stereoscopic immersive VR did not emerge solely 
from experiments with computer imaging technology. Further back in VR's technical 
history, and inscribed into Western enlightenment ideas about the structure (and 
ontology) of reality is the spatial paradigm of Euclidean space. The Cartesian coor-
dinate grid, as derived from Euclidean geometry, is "built into our culture and our 
perception" such that it "structures our thinking" (Penny 1994: 200), suggesting that 
to subvert this visual-spatial paradigm would be to render things incomprehensible. 
The Euclidean coordinate system provides a method and representational frame-
work for analytic geometry. As a system, it operates on the basis of axes. Two such 
axes, the horizontal (x) and vertical (y), account for two-dimensional planar space. 
With the addition of the "z' axis designating depth, a three-dimensional coordinate 
system can be represented. Theoretically, in such a system every point in space can 
be mapped and represented. Accordingly, two- and three-dimensional objects can be 
described symbolically using mathematical systems, since every point in space can be 
ascribed a "place number". Metaphysical reality is, in this sense, literally a matter of 
rationalizing space in the abstract. Indeed, Bruno Latour proposes that "reality'' is 
precisely how laboratories define it, using the objectification of protein as an exam-
ple: Latour envisages a time when protein was an undifferentiated "whitish stuff" 
(Latour 1987: 87) for biologists; not an object per se. "Reality" is also by Bolter and 
Gromala described as "80 million polygons per second", a statistic that refers to the 
underlying image processing required to produce fully realistic images on a computer 
screen): 
This would be the ultimate victory for the strategy of transparency because 
it would no longer be possible for the viewer to see the medium (computer 
graphics animation) at all. ... What began in the Renaissance, or with Zeuxis in 
ancient Greece, would culminate in cyberspace. (Bolter & Gromala, 2003: 40) 
In computer imaging, a polygon is the basic unit of surface structure of a more 
complex virtual object. Polygons are visual representations (usually triangular planes), 
displayed in pixels, of the mathematically defined solid geometry that make up the 
surfaces of cylinders, boxes, pyramids, and more organic forms of more complex 
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computer models. It is easy to see how Latour's "undifferentiated white stuff" is 
analogous to the basic unit of surface structure in virtual imaging systems. Unlike 
protein in its pre-rendered state, the "stuff" of stereo-immersive VR imagery had 
no primordial ontology. However, the analogy does hold: Latour's point is that the 
undifferentiated becomes "real" as an object, through some technique in the labora-
tory context, and is represented and promulgated through the discourse of techno-
science. This latter point is the significant one in the analogy, since a VR "lab" is both 
the source of the basic "stuff" and the world in which the undifferentiated matter 
becomes a manifest object. 
Conclusion 
An exemplary virtual world exploits the "perception and action knowledge base the 
user already has from acting and interacting in the ordinary world" (Hagen 1991: 76). 
Exploiting vision's innate capacity, VR offers a substitute world through a transfer of 
visual-perceptual and motor skills; a transfer between "the real" and "the virtual" un-
compromised by any apparent intervening interface. This transferability founds the 
link between seeing and knowing in stereo-immersive VR, in which "the epistemic 
importance of vision" (Dretske 1969: 78) becomes something of particular impor-
tance to technicians and designers of stereo-immersive "virtual" spaces. This raises a 
question concerning whether the success of stereo-immersive VR is simultaneously 
the source of its own perceptual redundancy, because to bring into being the per-
ceptual basis of ordinary "real" reality, is to return the perceiver to where they were, 
perceptually, before entering into the VR world. This leaves vision with no further 
purpose other than to align itself with the ecological reciprocity by which reality can 
be substituted for itsel£ 
Gibson puzzled over the perplexities of vision for fifty years, and while he has his 
critics, Gibson's contribution to understanding visual perception reaches well into 
recent studies of vision and cognition (Port & Van Gelder 1995: 373). The theory 
of ecological optics, for instance, has been applied to machine vision in the emerg-
ing field of "ecological robotics" - a transfer of knowledge and methodology that 
confirms Gibson's ideas about what vision is for, by demonstrating with success 
that it does not matter what kind of organism ("agent") is doing the perceiving. In a 
similar vein, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn discuss what is required by a perceiver 
in order to grasp visually the three dimensional shape of an object, noting that the 
organism need not make complex, knowledge dependent inferences: 
At least in this case, it appears that specific properties of the ambient array are 
able, as Gibson would put it, to specify the three dimensional shape uniquely. 
Such results have helped kindle the current interest in Gibson's theory. (Fodor 
& Pylyshyn 2002: 212-213) 
Fodor and Pylyshyn do not specify that the interest comes from computer visualiza-
tion or VR developers. Yet as far as determining that the organism: (the immersant in 
the case) will see the virtual world as a three-dimensionally structured environment 
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through information provided directly from the ambient optic array, Gibson's contri-
bution to the field of virtual imaging technology is evident in the "striking parallels" 
between (Gibsonian) ecological psychology and new developments in computer vi-
sion, particularly with regard "how agents interact with the [virtual] environment" 
(Duchon, Warren, & Kaelbling 1998: 474). 
The perceptual mode specific to pictorial art - the "material practice" of vision 
as elicited in pictorial perception - presupposes a non-naive viewer and is rarely if 
ever confused with the kind of visual attention an observer would direct toward 
objects and scenes when perceiving the real world. Moreover, as Margaret Hagen 
points out: 
Pictures - good pictures, successful pictures - educate in terms of the pictorial 
possibilities of perception. Progressive pictures [according to a continuum of 
stylistic change over time] point out perceptual realities new to the pictttres of a 
culture, not new to its people [or to their experience of perceiving the ordinary 
world] (Hagen 1986: 81). 
Hagen thus provides an additional way to bracket the notion of realism, broadly 
understood as associated with a style of pictorial art, from the notion of realness 
proposed above, associated with the visual structure of stereo-immersive VR. Both 
photorealist painting and immersive VR draw reference from the visual structure of 
the ordinary world. But the difference between their respective referencing is defini-
tive, epistemological: it concerns the possibilities of perceptual experience that each 
offer. Pictorial possibilities, as Hagen suggests, include stylistic, semantic, aesthet-
ic, poetic, formal, physical and other aspects that vivify the pictorial art of various 
cultures. Importantly, these possibilities designate the capacity to see a picture as 
referring to something else (which seems to be a universal capacity. My use of the 
term "perceptual possibilities" builds on this notion of the capacity to see a picture 
as referring beyond itself, to include a more specific meaning: in representational 
painting, perhaps all painting, the painted world is given in addition to the real world 
-as a supplement to real world perception. In contrast, stereo-immersive VR gives 
the observer its world as a substitute, real-like world - as a temporary, notional re-
placement for the real one. For stereo-immersive virtual technology, this is no mean 
achievement. However, the kind of perceptual possibilities this realness invokes are 
arguably less engaging than the perceptual possibilities of pictures. Pictures give us 
supplementary, non-habitable, worlds-within-the-world. To perceive virtual objects 
as three-dimensional volumetric forms, is to perceive them as alrearjy real forms; to 
have them in their realness. 
"Realism" as opposed to "realness" thus marks a definitive difference between 
pictorial and real-world perception respectively. This difference is epistemological, 
rather than a matter of degree (for example, of detail or resolution), and corre-
sponds to the way assumptions about what vision is for, find expression and manifest 
differentially within the enterprises of pictorial representation and the design of 
virtual worlds. 
